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Confessions of a Sociolator1 
 
One of the most stimulating recent developments in radical IR thinking is the 
appearance of a spirited critique of ‘the social turn’ in international theory.2 Led 
by Patricia Owens, this critique argues that attempts to ground ‘the international’ 
in a wider ontology of ‘social’ structures and relations, (attempts which range 
from constructivism through scientific realism to Marxism in all its varieties), 
court an enormous danger. Even if their own intentions are critical, these 
advocates of a ‘social turn’ have been importing a nomenclature whose centre of 
gravity lies in the emergence of reactionary discourses of control from the late 
18th Century onwards. This emergence was itself a constitutive part of the rise of 
new, historically specific forms of domination associated with capitalism. The 
attempt therefore to elevate sociological categories into a general language of 
(trans)historical explanation serves only to naturalise these new forms of 
domination whose exposure is the key to a genuinely critical approach in IR. 
‘Sociolatry’, not Sociology, is the unfailing, if unintended, result. 
 
Is Owens right to argue that the language of ‘social’ analysis is necessarily 
ideologically loaded in this way? In this short note, I would like to revisit a 
contribution of my own to ‘the social turn’ in the 1990s that was made by using 
C. Wright Mills’ famous book The Sociological Imagination.3 Mills argued that the 
achievements of classical social theory – including Durkheim, Weber and Marx – 
comprise an enduring foundation for the modern social sciences. His savage 
critiques of what he called ‘grand theory’ and ‘abstracted empiricism’ were all 
about the ways that later social scientists, often under the pretense of making 
new advances, were in fact falling short of the promise embodied in that earlier 
tradition of what he called Classic Social Analysis. And he argued that the tools of 
Classic Social Analysis were not the source, but rather the antidote to the 
ideological liabilities incurred by the academic disciplines of his day. Looking 
back on this a further two decades on, I still believe that classical social theory 
provides essential resources for IR. Yet I also think that Owens is right to suggest 
that even (or especially) these resources need to be treated critically so as to 
expose any hidden liabilities. I even agree that the importing of Classic Social 
Analysis does bring serious liabilities for IR – a problem to which my earlier use 
of Mills’ work was oblivious. However, as I shall indicate below, for me these 
liabilities lie in a quite different direction from those that Owens proposes. 
 
                                                        
1 This paper is an edited version of a presentation delivered to the Millennium Symposium on 
‘The Global Imagination: Sociology and Philosophy’, held at LSE on June 20th 2015. I am grateful 
to all the participants, and especially to the Editors who invited me to submit the presentation for 
publication in Millennium. 
2 Patricia Owens, ‘Method or Madness? Sociolatry in International Thought’, Review of 
International Studies, Vol.41, no.4 (2015), 655-674. Owens’ article is part of a forum on 
‘Historicising the Social in International Thought’. See also: Jens Bartelson, ‘Towards a Genealogy 
of ‘Society’ in International Relations’, Review of International Studies, Vol.41, no.4 (2015), 675-
692; and Martin Weber, ‘On the History and Politics of the Social Turn’, Review of International 
Studies, Vol.41, no.4 (2015), 693-714. 
3 Justin Rosenberg, ‘The International Imagination: IR Theory and “Classic Social Analysis”’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.23, No.1, 1994, pp.85-108. C. Wright Mills, The 
Sociological Imagination, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959). 
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So what was the breakthrough that Mills attributed to Classic Social Analysis? In 
a word, it was the discovery of society itself. It was the growing conviction that 
human affairs were not governed by supernature – by the existence of a 
transcendent divinity. And nor were they explicable by reference to a biologically 
fixed human nature, as appeared to be the case for other animal species. In 
between the realm of supernature above and the groundedness of human life in 
organic nature below, lies the social construction of reality. And from 
Montesquieu onwards, classical social theorists used comparative historical 
analysis to show that the variability of human societies was much wider than 
could be accounted for by any notion of a fixed human nature. They also argued 
that the causal and explanatory significance of these different forms of society 
reached all the way down from their political, economic and belief systems, 
through their artistic styles and practices, and right into the shaping of individual 
psyches. And from these twin perceptions – about the historical range and the 
constitutive depth of the social construction of reality – there emerged, 
according to Mills, three basic premises that together compose ‘the sociological 
imagination’. 
 
The first premise was the idea of social structure. What did Mills mean by this 
term? He meant that every individual human life is lived out within a particular 
historical configuration of collectively reproduced relationships, ideas and 
situations. This particular configuration, he argued, is fundamental to explaining 
social behavior. And that is because it shapes both the way that individuality is 
differentially produced in different times and places and the wider social issues 
that individuals face in their interaction with the world around them.  
 
And we should perhaps add immediately that this invoking of ‘structure’ does 
not amount to a denial of agency. On the contrary, it involves a massively 
enlarged perception of human agency because the enormous variability of these 
social structures in time and space indicates that they are themselves 
expressions of the social construction of reality in different forms.4 
 
And for this reason, although he was not starry-eyed about the relation between 
reason and freedom, Mills did believe that uncovering the role of social structure 
was a key to people taking political responsibility for their lives and achieving 
self-determination: ‘the social task of reason is to formulate choices, to enlarge 
the scope of human decisions in the making of history’.5 
 
The second basic principle is the awareness that these social structures are 
always historical in a double sense. On the one hand, there is no such thing as 
‘social structure’ in the abstract – there are only particular historical structures 
that exist in the world. This is ‘what Marx called the “principle of historical 
specificity”’.6 And it entails a special role for comparative historical analysis. Only 
                                                        
4 Indeed, Mills argued that this social construction of reality differentially configured even the 
human senses themselves: ‘[w]ithin the broad limits of the physiology of the sense organs, our 
very perception of the physical world, the colors we discriminate, the smells we become aware 
of, the noises we hear, are socially patterned and socially constructed.’ (ibid., 162) 
5 Ibid., 174. 
6 Ibid.,149. 
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when we compare a given society with others in history do we discover what is 
specific to it, and therefore exactly what it is that we need to explain in order to 
understand how this kind of society works. 
 
On the other hand, Mills also argued that social structures are historical in the 
additional sense that they are not static. And not only do they change over time, 
but also they have different mechanisms of historical change, and these too are 
rooted in their historically specific forms as social structures. This is what Marx 
meant when he argued that social formations had differential ‘laws of motion’, or 
what Max Weber meant when he talked about the role of ‘ideal-typical 
developmental constructs’ in historical explanation.7 And for Mills, this 
perception too had a deeply political significance. The realization that social 
change is structured in historically specific ways enables us to see ‘the present as 
history’ and thereby, he thought, to intervene in it to enlarge the scope of human 
choice and freedom. 
 
Finally, Mills also drew from the classical tradition a premise of social totality. By 
this he did not mean there was a single deterministic theory by which everything 
about a society could be explained. What he meant was that the modern 
academic disciplines have divided up social reality ‘more or less accidentally’ in 
self-limiting ways.8 Each has tended to form free-standing theories of the 
particular aspect of society in which it has specialized – whether that be politics, 
economics, psychology, or even comparative literature. In reality, however, these 
aspects are profoundly interconnected with each other because they are all parts 
of a single social structure at a given point in time. And a key part of the 
sociological imagination is its ability to transcend these disciplinary divisions 
and to grasp how the different aspects of social existence are interconnected 
with each other – as Marx, and Weber and Durkheim all did.  
 
In the context of the present-day critique of ‘the social’, it is perhaps especially 
important to emphasise the implication of this point: Mills’ book is not an advert 
for the discipline of Sociology at all, or even for the social science disciplines 
alone. In his view, the sociological imagination can equally be found in the 
disciplines of Politics, Anthropology and History – and even in journalism and 
fiction. And of course about half the book is made up of attacks on dominant 
approaches in the Sociology of his day. 
 
Put more positively, Mills was trying to recover an inheritance that Classical 
Social Analysis had bequeathed to all the social sciences and humanities in 
common. And this inheritance was the ability to perceive the social construction 
of reality, the historicity of social structures and the interconnectedness of 
                                                        
7 As Ellen Wood points out, Marx believed that every kind of society ‘has its own specific mode of 
economic activity, with its own laws of motion, its own logic of process’. (Democracy Against 
Capitalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p.150). Meanwhile, Max Weber argued 
that developmental ideal-types had ‘unique heuristic significance’ (ibid. p.103) so long as they 
were not conflated with the real historical process. (‘”Objectivity” in Social Science’, in The 
Methodology of the Social Sciences, edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, (New York: The 
Free Press, 1949), pp.102-03).  
8 Mills, The Sociological Imagination, p.140. 
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individual and collective forms of human agency. Or to use his own terms, it was 
about how biography and history intersected in social structures to produce ‘all 
the social worlds in which [people] have lived, are living and might live’.9 
 
By extension, the value of the sociological imagination to the study of global 
politics is that it reconnects IR to the founding premises of modern social 
thought itself. And it challenges us to operationalize these premises in the study 
of the global social structure so as to reveal its historical specificity and to 
discover ‘the present as history’ at the level of world development. 
 
I first read the Sociological Imagination just after completing my PhD in 1992. 
And what struck me most of all was how Mills’ diagnosis spoke so powerfully to 
the debate between neorealism and its critics which had dominated the 
discipline of IR in the previous decade. 
 
Neorealism, in fact, seemed to violate every premise of Classical Social Analysis.  
 
First, it violated the premise of totality by cordoning international politics off 
into a separate object domain and claiming that any attempt to reintegrate it into 
the wider social world must end in a retreat from theory into thick description.10  
 
This separating out meant, secondly, that the logic of IR was abstracted from any 
historically specific set of social structures – in fact neo-realists took pride in 
asserting the timeless, unhistorical nature of the international.11 Mills of course 
had argued that the ultimate focus of modern social analysis lay in its attempt to 
relate the world around us to the defining historical process of the contemporary 
era: namely the rise and spread of modern industrial forms of society.12 In effect, 
the leading theory of IR had simply abdicated from this responsibility.  
 
And finally, neo-realism even made a nonsense of the idea of social structure. In 
Waltz’s hands, the term social structure no longer referred to configurations of 
relations between people. It now referred to relations between states as 
irreducible actors. So, rather than enabling us to deconstruct reified forms of 
human agency, it became a recipe for reproducing the reification itself at the 
level of theory. 
 
The sociological imagination struck me as the perfect antidote to this situation. 
And in my 1994 article, I argued for its immediate application in IR theory. 
Looking back on it now, I still agree with Mills that classical social theory 
provides indispensable premises for social analysis, and therefore for IR too. I 
                                                        
9 Ibid., 132. 
10 For Waltz’s defense of this latter assumption, see ‘Interview with Ken Waltz’, conducted by 
Fred Halliday and Justin Rosenberg, Review of International Studies, (1998) Vol. 24, 371-386, 
especially 377ff. 
11 See for examples: Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), p.211; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading, Mass.: 
Addison-Wesley 1979), p.66; Martin Wight, ‘Why is there no international theory?’, in Herbert 
Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.) Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of 
International Politics (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,) 1966, 26-27. 
12 Mills, The Sociological Imagination, 152-53. 
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also think that these premises (of structure, history and totality) largely survive 
the critique of ‘the social’ made by Owens today. After all, not only does Mills 
share her view that most sociological ‘analysis’ participates in the ideological 
naturalization of modern forms of domination; but also, her own constructive 
argument (that these forms are rooted in a specifically modern re-articulation of 
‘household’ governance) is itself an instance of the sociological imagination: that 
is to say, it analyses the contemporary human condition by identifying a 
particular kind of patterning or structuring of social relations, by asserting the 
radical historical specificity of its modern form, and by then tracing the 
significance of this form for the interconnected realms of gender, politics, war 
and knowledge production. It would be hard to imagine an intellectual 
procedure that is truer than this to the spirit of Mills’ sociological imagination. 
 
However, I also believe that Owens is nonetheless quite right to warn that the 
importing of the language of ‘the social’ into IR may be freighted with 
assumptions we need to excavate and challenge. And in respect to my 1994 
article, a kind of ‘sociolator’s confession’ may indeed be in order. That article was 
entitled ‘The International Imagination’. And yet it contained no suggestion at all 
that the word ‘international’ brings with it any real addition to the three 
premises (of structure, history and totality) that already compose the 
sociological imagination.  
 
Like so many critical interventions, it was too busy importing ideas from outside 
IR to notice that IR itself might be rooted in an aspect of reality that is as 
ontologically significant for social analysis in general as are those three other 
premises.  
 
What I mean by this is the condition of internationality itself, the fact that the 
human world is made up of multiple interacting societies. And I suppose the 
reason I did not notice the significance of this is that Mills had not noticed it, 
which in turn is probably because the Classical Social Theorists had not noticed it 
either.  
 
So, although Mills talks about the modern era as being one in which different 
worlds are brought into intense interaction,13 he does not integrate this 
interaction into his conceptualization of the social. The multiplicity of societies, 
the international, simply does not reach that far down in his worldview, just as it 
did not for the classical social theorists. And yet we know empirically not just 
that human social existence has always been both multiple and interactive, but 
also that interaction between societies adds a completely extra dimension of 
causality to the social world and its development.  
 
On the one hand, societal multiplicity – that lateral field of more than one co-
existing society – justifies the existence of a discipline of IR because it generates 
an entire range of specifically international social phenomena, (from war and 
                                                        
13 ‘It is perhaps one defining characteristic of our period that it is one in which for the first time 
the varieties of social worlds it contains are in serious, rapid, and obvious interplay. The study of 
our period must be a comparative examination of these worlds and of their interactions.’ (Ibid., 
150) 
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peace through diplomacy, international law, world trade and processes of 
collective identity formation). And these cannot be fully grasped using the 
categories formulated to analyse their ‘domestic’ equivalents. But on the other 
hand, those domestic phenomena themselves – including language, culture and 
the structures of social, economic and political life – are chronically shaped by 
the consequences of inter-societal co-existence. The human social world is thus 
not only illuminated by the comparative fact of difference among societies in 
space and time (as Classic Social Analysis perceived so well); it is also partly 
shaped by the interactive consequences of inter-societal co-existence. The widely 
noted neglect of this by Classic Social Analysis has meant that scholars across the 
social sciences who draw on this tradition have been burdened with an 
apparently insoluble problem of ‘methodological nationalism’14 – a problem 
which mirrors in its inner shape the equal and opposite reification of the 
international produced by neorealism. 
 
It is these twin problems that are arguably overcome by the idea of uneven and 
combined development (U&CD). This idea retains the classical insistence that 
social phenomena are always the expression of structured, historically specific 
forms of human agency (and hence of social ‘development’); but it reimagines 
these in the context of multiple (‘uneven’) and interacting (‘combined’) societies. 
It thereby builds the inter-societal back into the foundational premises of social 
theory from which the Classic Social Analysts had unwittingly excluded it.  
 
U&CD is thus arguably what the sociological imagination looks like when its 
inherited problem of ‘internalism’ or ‘methodological nationalism’ has been 
overcome. And in recent years, it has dramatically outgrown its origins in Leon 
Trotsky’s explanation for the Bolshevik Revolution. A growing literature has 
applied it to a lengthening list of historical cases – from the phenomenon of 
‘globalisation’ in the 1990s, through the Iranian revolution of 1979, the world 
wars and revolutionary upheaval of the first half of the 20th Century, the Meiji 
Restoration and the ‘Eastern Question’ in the 19th Century (as well as the overall 
‘global transformation’ of international relations in that period), the yet earlier 
‘rise of the West’ that created the shape of modern world affairs, and even the 
world history debates about the prehistoric emergence of geopolitics itself.15 At 
                                                        
14 The term was originally coined by Herminio Martins in 1974 in ‘Time and Theory in Sociology’, 
in J. Rex (ed.) Approaches to Sociology, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. However, its referent – 
the failure of classical social theory to address the international – has been identified many times, 
both previously and subsequently, and under numerous different names. See, for examples, 
Gianfranco Poggi (1965) ‘A Main Theme of Contemporary Sociological Analysis: Its Achievements 
and Limitations’, British Journal of Sociology, 16(4): 283-94; Theda Skocpol (1973) ‘A critical 
review of Barrington Moore’s Social origins of dictatorship and democracy’, Politics and Society, 
4:1, 1–34; Neil Smelser (1992) ‘External and internal factors in theories of social change’ in Hans 
Haferkamp and Neil J Smelser (eds) Social change and modernity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press), 369–394; and perhaps above all, Friedrich Tenbruck (1994) ‘Internal history of 
society or universal history’, Theory, Culture & Society, 11, 75–93.   
15 For examples of these different applications, see respectively: Justin Rosenberg, ‘Globalisation 
Theory: a Post Mortem’, International Politics 42:1 (2005): 2-74; Kamran Matin, Recasting Iranian 
Modernity: International Relations and Social Change, (London: Routledge 2013); Alex Anievas, 
Capital, the State, and War: Class Conflict and Geopolitics in the Thirty Years’ Crisis, 1914-1945, 
(Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press 2014); James Allinson and Alex Anievas, ‘The 
Uneven and Combined Development of the Meiji Restoration: a Passive Revolutionary Road to 
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the same time, its methodological implications for thinking about social 
causality, about the problem of Eurocentrism, and about the wider vexed 
relation of theory and history have been gradually unfolding too.16  
 
Naturally, the many contributions to this research programme have also been 
engaged in a healthy internal debate about the ontological and epistemological 
scope of the idea. Nonetheless, their continuing accumulation is a welcome sign 
indeed: for the idea of U&CD makes it conceivable that the ultimate – albeit too 
long delayed – result of the ‘social turn’ in IR is not that we trap ourselves in an 
ideologically compromised language of explanation; it is rather that ‘the 
international’ itself is finally released from the realist prison in which it has been 
incarcerated for so long.17 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Capitalist Modernity’, Capital and Class, No. 102 (2010): 469-490; Kerem Nişancıoğlu, ‘The 
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Development”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26:3, (2013): 573-597; Kamran Matin, 
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